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I. INTRODUCTION
For decades before 1996, damages awarded for personal injuries
were not taxable. 1 The Internal Revenue Code had excluded from taxable
income damages awarded for “personal injuries or sickness.” 2 In 1996,
however, Congress amended § 104(a)(2) so that the exclusion applied
only to “personal physical injuries or physical sickness.” 3 The amendment
further specified that “emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical
injury or physical sickness.” 4
Thus, after decades of settled law, Congress created the need to
distinguish, for tax purposes, between injuries that are “physical” and
those that are not—a line that is difficult to draw. Additionally, it declared
that “emotional distress” is not “physical”—despite scientific research
establishing the strong connection between emotional and physical
aspects of human health. 5 Further, by giving disfavored tax treatment to
damages for emotional distress, as distinguished from damages for

1. “From the beginning of tax time, awards or settlement proceeds for personal injuries have
been excluded from taxation.” Perez v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. 51, 59 (2015) (citing Revenue Act of 1918,
ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919)).
2. I.R.C. § 22(b)(5) (1939) (current version at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2018)).
3. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755,
1838.
4. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2000).
5. See, e.g., Brian Vastag, Decade of Work Shows Depression Is Physical, 287 JAMA 1787,
1787 (2002).
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physical injuries, it acted against the trend in tort law, which has long
accepted that emotional harm is as legitimate as physical harm. This
division between taxable emotional distress damages and nontaxable
emotional distress damages—hinging on the definition of “physical
injuries”—is highlighted in the context of sexual harassment cases.
Sexual harassment victims are often awarded emotional distress
damages and thus often pay taxes on their awards, even though claims
involving unwanted sexual advances and contact seem incontrovertibly
and inherently physical. At what point is the abuse sufficiently “physical”
under the Internal Revenue Code that the victim will not be taxed on the
award? The prevailing interpretation of “physical” requires observable
bodily harm, such as a cut or a bruise. 6 In other words, the damages are
taxed if sexual harassment causes anxiety and depression, insomnia,
headaches, and stomach problems. Damages are not taxed, though, if the
sexual harassment is memorialized with a bruise.
This Article proposes a conception of the “personal physical injury”
exclusion that does not require observable bodily harm. The § 104
exclusion has historically been interpreted by reference to tort principles.
And tort law has long recognized the legitimacy of emotional distress
arising from invasions of physical interests that do not cause bodily harm,
even when it would not recognize emotional distress in other contexts.
The personal physical injury exclusion should be interpreted to recognize
the inherently physical nature of some torts, particularly the trespassory
torts of battery and false imprisonment, which protect against invasions
of a person’s physical autonomy, security, and liberty. Thus, emotional
distress suffered as a result of these inherently physical torts is attributable
to a personal physical injury and should be excluded.
Part I below provides a brief history of, and the purported rationale
for, the personal injury exclusion and an overview of the criticisms of the
1996 amendment. Part II illustrates the current state of the personal
physical injury exclusion with several hypotheticals, including
application of the infamous Bruise Ruling. Part III sets out and fully
explains this Article’s proposal: that the “personal physical injury”
exclusion of § 104(a)(2) should be interpreted consistently with tort
principles such that emotional distress damages attributable to intentional
invasions into a person’s physical autonomy, security, and liberty should
be excluded from taxable income regardless of whether the tortfeasor
memorializes the event with a bruise. Part IV shows that the legislative
history of the amendment indicates that Congress did not set out to change
6.

See infra Part II.C.
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80 years of tax law by taxing emotional distress damages attributable to
these physical invasions identified in Part III. Part V highlights, in support
of this Article’s argument, a sex abuse case in which the IRS was willing
to assume § 104(a)(2) “personal physical injuries.”
II. BRIEF HISTORY AND RATIONALE OF THE PERSONAL INJURY
EXCLUSION
An exclusion for damages recovered for personal injuries was first
codified in 1919. 7 Several rationales have been offered in support of the
long-standing exclusion. The primary justification for excluding from
taxable income damages awarded for personal injuries is the idea that
these kinds of recoveries merely restore the plaintiff to the same position
he would have been in without the personal injury. The plaintiff has
merely recovered “human capital,” and he has not recognized any gain. 8
The exclusion might, alternatively, be based on compassion for the
victim, 9 or the idea that the government should not benefit from the
misfortune of its citizens. 10 It has also been proposed that the exclusion is
justified because the taxpayer’s injury—and accession to wealth—is
involuntary. 11 He surely would have rather avoided the physical injury—
and the damages—and it would be unduly harsh to tax him for a recovery
he would have rather avoided. 12
While, historically, it was generally understood that the personal
injury exclusion applied to both physical and non-physical injuries, 13 the
exclusion was primarily utilized to exclude damages for physical injuries
and only a few nonphysical injuries such as defamation and loss of

7. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057, 1066 (1919).
8. O’Gilvie v. United States, 519 U.S. 79, 86 (1996) (describing the purpose of I.R.C. § 104(a)
as excluding “those damages that, making up for a loss, seek to make a victim whole, or, speaking
very loosely, ‘return the victim’s personal or financial capital.’”). This rationale, as all the others, has
been questioned. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal
Injury: To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 327, 343 (1995); Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts,
77 CORNELL L. REV. 143, 152–53 (1992).
9. J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Tax Treatment of Employment-Related Personal
Injury Awards: The Need for Limits, 50 MONT. L. REV. 13, 43 (1989).
10. Kahn, supra note 8, at 349.
11. Id. at 347–48.
12. Id.
13. See United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 236 n.6 (1992) (“Although the IRS briefly
interpreted § 104(a)(2)’s statutory predecessor, § 213(b)(6) of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1066,
to restrict the scope of personal injuries to physical injuries, . . . the courts and the IRS long since have
recognized that § 104(a)(2)’s reference to ‘personal injuries’ encompasses, in accord with common
judicial parlance and conceptions, nonphysical injuries to the individual, such as those affecting
emotions, reputation, or character, as well.”).
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consortium. 14 In the 1980s and 90s, courts began interpreting the statute
much more broadly, though, extending it to more cases that did not relate
to physical injuries. For example, it was held that damages were excluded
from taxable income for deprivation of the right to free speech, 15 for
injuries to professional reputation, 16 wrongful discharge, 17 and violation
of the ADEA. 18
As a result of the expanded interpretation of the exclusion to
encompass all manner of damages—an exclusion that was seen to have
“careened out of control with respect to nonphysical personal
injuries” 19—the IRS sought to modify § 104(a)(2) to limit the exclusion
to damages for personal physical injuries, rather than just personal
injuries. 20
A.

The 1996 Modification—”Physical” Injury and Sickness

In 1996, Congress radically changed the personal injury exclusion by
§ 1605 of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 entitled: “Repeal
of Exclusion for Punitive Damages and for Damages Not Attributable to
Physical Injuries or Sickness.” 21 Revised § 104(a)(2), and the current
version thereof, reads:

14. Burke & Friel, supra note 9, at 39–41.
15. Bent v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 236, 249 (1986), aff’d, 835 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1988).
16. See Miller v. Comm’r, 93 T.C. 330, 335 (1989); Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 848 F.2d 81, 82
(6th Cir. 1988).
17. Byrne v. Comm’r, 883 F.2d 211, 216 (3d Cir. 1989).
18. Schleier v. Comm’r, 26 F.3d 1119, 1119 (5th Cir. 1994), rev’d, 515 U.S. 323 (1995).
19. J. Martin Burke & Michael K. Friel, Getting Physical: Excluding Personal Injury Awards
Under the New Section 104(a)(2), 58 MONT. L. REV. 167, 167 (1997). It is interesting to note that this
is not the only context in which the meaning of “personal injury” has been so difficult. There are three
recognized approaches to interpreting “personal injury” in § 1328(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which excludes from discharge debts owed due to “personal injury” inflicted by the debtor. A “narrow
approach requires a physical injury to the individual”; a “middle approach reads “personal injury” to
include some non-physical injuries such as defamation, sexual harassment, age discrimination, and
emotional distress, but not business or financial injuries; and a “broad approach includes business and
financial injuries if they are defined as a personal injury tort under non-bankruptcy law.” In re Bailey,
555 B.R. 557, 561 (Bankr. N. D. Miss. 2016).
20. Congress attempted, unsuccessfully, in 1989 to limit the exclusion for “personal injuries
and sickness” to cases involving physical injuries and sickness. H.R. 3299, 101st Cong. § 11641
(1989). While that amendment did not pass, what did pass was an amendment that nonetheless treated
damages related to nonphysical injuries less favorably than damages related to nonphysical injury,
but only with respect to punitive damages. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-239, § 7641(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2379 (amending I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)). Thus, the amendment only
strengthened the argument that, pre-1996, the “personal injury” exclusion covered both physical and
nonphysical injuries. See Morgan L. Holcomb, Tax Anxiety, 14 FLA. TAX REV. 77, 87 (2013).
21. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat. 1755,
1838.
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(a) [G]ross income does not include—
(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as period
payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical
sickness; . . . .
For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not be treated as
a physical injury or physical sickness.” 22

Thus, where pre-1996 the exclusion had been for damages received
on account of “personal injuries or sickness,” after the 1996 modification,
the exclusion now applies only to “personal physical injuries or physical
sickness.” Further, all punitive damages are taxed post-1996, even if
received on account of physical injuries or physical sickness, with one
very narrow exception. 23
Significantly, where compensatory damages are received on account
of “personal physical injuries,” the entire amount is excludable. That is,
lost wages—if received on account of personal physical injury—are
excluded even though they are a substitute for otherwise taxable income. 24
And damages for emotional distress—if received on account of personal
physical injuries—are excluded, despite the statute’s declaration that
“emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury.” 25
Thus, whether a plaintiff’s damage award is received “on account of
personal physical injuries,” is a critical point. A determination that
damages are received “on account of personal physical injuries” is a
watershed 26 determination bestowing tax-free status on all compensatory
damages flowing therefrom that would otherwise be taxable. What, then,
is the definition of “personal physical injuries,” as distinct from a

22. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2018).
23. Punitive damages in a wrongful death action are excluded from taxable income if state law
provides that only punitive damages may be awarded in a wrongful death action. See H.R. Rep. No.
104-737, at 301 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1793.
24. The broad principle that damage recoveries ought to be given the tax character of the item
for which they are intended to substitute breaks down in the context of physical injury recoveries. See
ROBERT W. WOOD, TAXATION OF DAMAGE AWARDS AND SETTLEMENT PAYMENTS 2–4 (2012 Supp.,
4th ed. 2009). Wages would have been taxable; thus, application of that general principal would lead
to the conclusion that damages for lost wages would be taxable.
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 2012) (“Emotional distress is not considered a
physical injury or physical sickness. However, damages for emotional distress attributable to a
physical injury or physical sickness are excluded from income under section 104(a)(2).”).
26. Robert W. Wood, Are False Imprisonment Recoveries Taxable?, TAX NOTES, April 21,
2008, at 279 (noting the “watershed” nature of physicality determination stating: “Once one crosses
the threshold of physicality, all damages flowing from the physical event, including emotional distress
damages, also become excludable.”).
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“personal injury,” under § 104(a)(2)? It is rather easy to determine that,
by adding the word “physical,” Congress wanted to curtail the exclusion.
But to what degree? The distinction has been the subject of much criticism
and confusion. The subject of even more criticism and confusion is the
modification’s treatment of damages awarded for emotional distress since
the modification declared that “emotional distress” is not a physical injury
or physical sickness.
B.

Criticisms, Confusion, and Calls for Reform

The idea that damages awarded for physical injuries are taxed
differently from damages awarded for emotional distress has been subject
to much criticism. As many have pointed out, the hypothesized rationales
for not taxing damages compensating victims for their physical injuries
also hold true in the context of damages to compensate victims for their
emotional injuries. 27 Additionally, the idea that emotional suffering is not
“physical” is contrary to modern scientific research that establishes the
strong connection between emotional and physical aspects of human
health. 28 Treating emotional harm as somehow less real or worthy of
compensation than physical harm is also counter to the decades long trend
in tort law. 29
The criticisms have spawned calls for reform that are wide ranging—
some arguing to tax more damage awards and some arguing to tax fewer
damage awards. One proposal is to make all damages received as a
substitute for lost income taxable, whether related to emotional or
physical harm, eliminating the distinction between “physical injuries and
physical sickness” and “emotional distress.” 30 Another proposal is to tax
nearly all damages, including those received on account of physical
injuries, and to inform juries of the tax consequences so that appropriate

27. E.g., Ronald H. Jensen, When are Damages Tax Free?: The Elusive Meaning of :Physical
Injury, 10 PITT. TAX REV. 87, 130 (2013).
28. See, e.g., Richard E. Gardner III, Mind Over Matter?: The Historical Search for
Meaningful Parity Between Mental and Physical Health Care Coverage, 49 EMORY L.J. 675, 675
(2000) (“[A]dvances [in] modern brain science and neuropsychology . . . suggest[] that a distinction
between the physical and the mental is, in many circumstances, spurious.”). Congress has recognized
that mental illnesses are physical illnesses, at least in the context of insurance. See Christopher Wright,
Taxation of Personal Injury Awards, Addressing the Mind/Body Dualism that Plagues 104(a)2) of
the Tax Code, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 211, 234–35 (2010) (noting that, by passing the Paul Wellstone
and Pete Domenici Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) and requiring
insurance companies to treat mental illness no differently than traditional physical illness, Congress
indicated its understanding the mental illness is physical illness).
29. See infra Part III.
30. Jensen, supra note 27, at 134–35.
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adjustments may be made. 31 The National Taxpayer Advocate has
proposed that damages for emotional distress should be excluded the same
as damages for physical injuries, pointing out that the issue of taxation of
damages “spurs litigation every year.” 32
The issue addressed in this Article—the meaning of “personal
physical injuries”—is only one component of the confusion arising from
the § 104(a)(2) exclusion. 33 It is not always the “personal physical injury”
phrase of the statute that is problematic for the taxpayer seeking to exclude
a damage award from taxable income; instead, it is often the “on account
of” part of the statute that is fatal to the taxpayer. 34 The proposal of this
Article is related specifically to the meaning of “personal physical
injuries.”
The 1996 modification addressed in this Article is not new, and
neither are the criticisms or proposals for reform. Different from previous
proposals, though, this Article proposes a conception of the “personal
physical injury” exclusion that, without modification of the statute or
revision of the regulations, will bring back into the exclusion at least some
damage awards for emotional distress. By interpreting “personal physical
injury” to refer to the tort concept of “physical injury,” the exclusion will
include (and render tax free) damages awarded for emotional distress
suffered by victims of battery, assault, and false imprisonment, regardless
of whether the perpetrator memorializes their tort with a bruise or a cut.
III. CURRENT STATUS OF THE PERSONAL PHYSICAL INJURY EXCLUSION
AND ILLUSTRATIONS
Section 104(a)(2) currently reads as follows:
31. Holcomb, supra note 20, at 80.
32. Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, 2009 Annual Report to Congress 351–57 (2009),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2_09_ tas_arc_vol_1_lr.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CEN-P6TR]; see also
Nat’l
Taxpayer
Advocate,
2008
Annual
Report
to
Congress
472
(2008),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/tas/08_tas_arc_mli.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2VM6-EE7N](“Taxation
of
damage awards spurs litigation every year.”).
33. See Holcomb, supra note 20, at 97–99 (explaining that, in addition to problems of
interpreting “personal physical injury” and the “on account of” requirement, plaintiffs face other
problems, in particular problems with allocation of the damage award).
34. E.g., Hansen v. Comm’r, 97 T.C.M. 1447, at *6 (2009). (the complaint and the agreement
did not specify that the settlement was on account of the physical injuries); Nield v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summ. Op. 2002-12, at *8 (Aug. 27, 2002) (court did not find credible taxpayer’s evidence that
damages were awarded “on account of” the physical injuries, as allegations were lacking in the
complaint and the settlement agreement); Mumy v. Comm’r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2005-122, at *5 (Aug.
24, 2005) (“the document, however, does not contain any language which specifically states that the
amount paid was to settle the harassment claim, the emotional stress claim, or the assault and
battery.”).
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(a) [G]ross income does not include—
(2) the amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as period
payments) on account of personal physical injuries or physical
sickness; . . . .
For purposes of paragraph (2), emotional distress shall not be treated as
a physical injury or physical sickness.” 35

Although the language of the statute might appear to mean that
damages awarded for emotional distress are taxable, that is an
oversimplification. The legislative history and the relevant regulations
explain that damages awarded for emotional distress may also be excluded
from income (even though, according to the last sentence in the above
quoted statutory language, they are not in and of themselves “personal
physical injuries”) if the emotional distress damages are “attributable to”
a physical injury or sickness. 36
The legislative history of the Act (the House Report) states: “Because
all damages received on account of physical injury or physical sickness
are excludable from gross income, the exclusion from gross income
applies to any damages received based on a claim of emotional distress
that is attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.” 37 Treasury
Regulation 1.104-1, finally updated in 2012 to address the then-sixteenyear-old amendment, reiterated the position of the House Report that,
although emotional distress is not a “physical injury or physical sickness,”
certain damages for emotional distress may be excluded. 38 Pursuant to
Treasury Regulation 1.104-1: “[D]amages for emotional distress
attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness are excluded from
income under section 104(a)(2).” 39
A.

The Personal Physical Injury Exclusion Illustrated—Two Lawyers

The following hypotheticals 40 illustrate the differing tax treatment
of, on one hand, emotional distress damages arising from a classic
personal injury case for which § 104(a)(2) traditionally (before and after
the 1996 modification) provided an exclusion and, on the other hand,
emotional distress damages arising from a “personal injury” that were
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

I.R.C. § 104(a) (2018).
See infra Part VI.B’s discussion of the flawed logic in this language.
H.R. Rep. No. 104-737, at 300–01, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792–93.
Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 2012).
Id.
These hypotheticals are adapted from Burke & Friel, supra note 19, at 182–87.
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once excluded by § 104(a)(2) but are no longer excluded as a result of the
“physical” qualifier added in 1996.
Lawyer 1 (negligence resulting in observable bodily harm)—Lawyer
1 is a successful solo practitioner and is seriously injured in an automobile
accident. He brings a negligence action against the driver who caused the
accident. Lawyer 1 is awarded damages for the following: (1) pain and
suffering; (2) past and future medical expenses; (3) lost income as a result
of being unable to practice law; (4) emotional distress as a result of being
unable to practice; and (5) physical ailments, e.g., headaches, vomiting,
loss of appetite and sleeplessness, resulting from the emotional distress.
All compensatory damages awarded to Lawyer 1 are excludable under §
104(a)(2)—both before and after the 1996 modification.
Specifically focusing on the emotional distress aspect of the award,
those would be excluded under the post-1996 “personal physical injury”
exclusion. Even though Congress specifically provided in the statute that
emotional distress is not considered a physical injury or sickness for
purposes of § 104(a)(2), 41 because the emotional distress is “attributable
to a physical injury,” it is excludable. The legislative history of the
statute 42 and Treasury Regulation 1.104-1 43 make clear that, because all
damages received on account of physical injury or physical sickness are
excludable, the exclusion applies to any damages received based on a
claim of emotional distress that is attributable to a physical injury or
physical sickness.
Lawyer 2 (wrongful termination)—Lawyer 2 is wrongfully
terminated by his employer. He suffers emotional distress and even
associated physical ailments, such as headaches, vomiting, loss of
appetite, and sleeplessness. He is under constant care of a physician or
even hospitalized for a period. He brings a claim against his employer and
is awarded damages for the following: (1) lost wages; (2) emotional
distress; and (3) the physical ailments resulting from his emotional
distress.
Because Lawyer 2’s claim did not have its origin in a personal
physical injury, the post-1996 § 104(a)(2) personal physical injury
41. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2018) (“emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or
physical sickness.”).
42. H.R. Rep. No. 104-737, at 300–01, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792–93
(“Because all damages received on account of physical injury or physical sickness are excludable
from gross income, the exclusion from gross income applies to any damages received based on a
claim of emotional distress that is attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.”).
43. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 2012) (“Emotional distress is not considered a
physical injury or physical sickness. However, damages for emotional distress attributable to a
physical injury or physical sickness are excluded from income under section 104(a)(2).”).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss1/3

10

Christoff: Tax Free Damages

2019]

TAX FREE DAMAGES

81

exclusion is inapplicable. He will be able to exclude damages awarded to
compensate for medical expenses incurred, even though they were related
to emotional distress. However, he will not be entitled to exclude any
other aspect of the award, even any award for physical symptoms of his
emotional distress.
Under the pre-1996 “personal injury” exclusion, Lawyer 2 may have
been able to successfully argue that the wrongful termination was a
“personal injury” and thus all damages were excluded. 44 However, after
the 1996 modification, Lawyer 2 clearly has no legitimate argument that
the wrongful termination was or caused a “personal physical injury” under
modified § 104(a)(2).
Lawyer 2 might attempt to argue, somewhat differently, that the
emotional distress resulting from the wrongful termination is itself a
personal physical injury. He might argue that there is no medical or
scientific difference between the mental suffering and physical suffering.
But Congress has foreclosed that argument by the plain language of the
statute. As mentioned previously, Congress specifically provided in §
104(a)(2) that emotional distress is not considered a physical injury or
sickness for purposes of § 104(a)(2). 45 As a result, Lawyer 2, although
suffering emotional distress and even associated physical ailments such
as headaches, vomiting, loss of appetite, and sleeplessness, has no basis
for excluding the award for emotional distress and its related physical
symptoms. The fact that Lawyer 2 is under constant care of a physician or
even hospitalized for a period would not change the result (although, as
noted above, Lawyer 2 may exclude recovery of medical expenses not
previously deducted).
There are a multitude of real world cases in which taxpayers suffered
physically but paid taxes on awards that compensated them for that
physical suffering because their physical suffering was caused by
emotional distress, but that emotional distress was not caused by a
“physical injury.” 46 For example, in Lindsey v. C.I.R., the taxpayer
experienced hypertension and stress-related symptoms, including periodic
impotency, insomnia, fatigue, occasional indigestion, and urinary
incontinence as a result of a business dispute. 47 Those physical problems

44. See, e.g., Bent v. Comm’r, 835 F.2d 67, 68 (3d Cir. 1987) (demonstrating that, pre-1996,
personal injuries damages excluded from taxable income under § 104(a)(2) included mental pain and
suffering, such as that suffered by the schoolteacher after his employment contract was not renewed).
45. I.R.C. § 104(a) (2018).
46. Or, at least they did not prove it, or the complaint or settlement agreement did not
adequately connect the emotional distress to a physical injury.
47. Lindsey v. Comm’r, 422 F.3d 684, 688–89 (8th Cir. 2005).
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were caused by emotional distress rather than “personal physical injuries
or physical sickness,” and thus were not excluded under § 104(a)(2). 48
There are several good arguments that the damages compensating
Lawyer 2 for his emotional distress should not be taxed if damages
compensating Lawyer 1 for his emotional distress are not taxed. Similarly
treated taxpayers should be treated similarly. And the emotional distress
experienced by Lawyer 2 is no less real than that suffered by Lawyer 1.
For tax purposes, however, Congress has chosen to ignore Lawyer 2’s
mental suffering with little to no rationale for the differing treatment.
The purpose for providing the above hypotheticals here is not to
make that broader argument that all awards for emotional distress should
be taxed the same. Instead, the purpose of the above two hypotheticals is
simply to illustrate the different treatment of emotional distress damages
where the underlying claims are easily labeled “physical”—in the case of
the car accident—and not physical—in the case of wrongful termination.
While the question of whether damages for emotional distress arising
from nonphysical injuries should be taxed if damages arising from
physical injuries are tax free may be difficult, it is at least easy to
distinguish between the physical nature of the car wreck claim and the
nonphysical nature of the wrongful termination claim.
The disparate tax treatment of emotional distress damages is more
puzzling where the line between “physical” and “nonphysical” is less
clear, such as in sexual harassment cases. The difficulty of distinguishing
between a physical injury and a nonphysical injury can be demonstrated
by the following additional hypotheticals.
B.

Three Law Clerks

Consider the following hypotheticals involving three law clerks
working for, and inappropriately touched by, the same horrible boss: 49
Law Clerk 1 (punch in the nose)—Boss has a particularly bad day
and punches Law Clerk 1 in the nose. Law Clerk 1 misses several days of
work, incurs medical bills, endures pain and suffering, and experiences
emotional distress, which manifests itself physically in the form of nausea
and insomnia. He brings an action for common law battery and is awarded
damages to compensate him for all of the above harms, including his
emotional distress.
Law Clerk 2 (fondling with a bruise)—Boss also regularly engages
in a pattern of sexual harassment toward the female law clerks, including
48.
49.

Id.
These hypotheticals are in part adapted from Holcomb, supra note 20, at 78–80.
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making lewd comments and fondling them against their wills. The
fondling of Law Clerk 2 results in a slight bruise to Law Clerk 2. Although
the bruise clears up in a few days, Law Clerk 2 experiences emotional
distress arising from the incident and her feelings of humiliation,
degradation, shame, and embarrassment persist. Law Clerk 2 brings an
action for common law battery and is awarded compensatory damages,
including damages for emotional distress.
Law Clerk 3 (fondling with no bruise)—Boss likewise sexually
harasses Law Clerk 3 in exactly the same way in which he harassed Law
Clerk 2—making lewd comments and fondling her against her will.
However, his fondling of Law Clerk 2 does not (for whatever reason)
result in a bruise or any other observable mark on her body memorializing
the traumatic event. Law Clerk 3 also experiences emotional distress
arising from the incident. And her feelings of humiliation, degradation,
shame, and embarrassment also persist. Law Clerk 3, like Law Clerk 2,
also brings an action for common law battery and is awarded
compensatory damages, including damages for emotional distress.
Each of the three law clerks has a common law claim for battery. 50
Each is awarded damages to compensate him or her for the emotional
distress resulting from the battery. The § 104(a)(2) personal physical
injury exclusion will exclude from taxable income the damages awarded
for the emotional distress of Law Clerk 1 and Law Clerk 2. However, the
personal injury exclusion will not apply to the damages awarded to Law
Clerk 3; her award is fully 51 taxable. She will be taxed like Lawyer 2 who
was wrongfully terminated.
It is difficult to understand why emotional distress resulting from a
“bruise-free” sexual battery is taxed like emotional distress resulting from
wrongful termination. Shouldn’t it be taxed like emotional distress
resulting from other instances of sexual battery (or from a car wreck or a
punch in the nose)? Sexual battery, car accidents, and punches in the nose
are all physical—being fired is not. But such is the result of “the Bruise
Ruling” discussed in the following section.
50. These plaintiffs will undoubtedly also have many other valid claims. This Article addresses
only the question of whether the damages awarded on account of the common law tort claims by
themselves should be excluded from income. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 26, at 279–82 (focusing
only on whether an wards for false imprisonment should be excluded from taxable income while
recognizing the wide variety of ancillary claims that might be asserted by a wrongfully incarcerated
individual, such as claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, The Innocence Protection Act of 2004, and state
legislation). Of course, allocation of the damage award between and among all claims the taxpayer
plaintiff asserts is a critical issue. See, e.g., Holcomb, supra note 20, at 99.
51. With the caveat that, if she is awarded medical expenses, even those related to emotional
distress are excluded to the extent not previously deducted.
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The Bruise Ruling

In a 2000 Private Letter Ruling, which has come to be referred to as
“The Bruise Ruling,” the IRS concluded that damages awarded to
compensate for unwanted physical contact (that is, a battery) without
“observable bodily harm” does not constitute “personal physical injuries
or physical sickness” for purposes of § 104(a)(2). 52 According to the
Bruise Ruling, the key test in identifying excludable versus taxable
damages is whether there is observable bodily harm, such as a bruise. 53
The Letter Ruling was issued in response to a woman who was
ultimately sexually assaulted by her employer after she had endured less
extreme incidents of sexual inappropriateness for a period. She ultimately
quit and filed suit alleging sexual harassment, battery, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The case was settled, but there was no
express allocation of damages in the settlement agreement. The IRS
concluded that the damages awarded for unwanted physical contact
without observable bodily harm were not received on account of personal
physical injuries or sickness and were therefore taxable. On the other
hand, damages awarded for pain, suffering, and emotional distress after
she suffered an observable physical injury were excludable under §
104(a)(2) because those damages were attributable to physical injuries.
The Letter Ruling identifies three separate periods and treats each a
bit differently for tax purposes:
Period A—The Period Prior to the First Pain Incident: During this
period, the woman’s employer began a “slow progression of attempts to
make sexual contact with [the woman]” and also made several “suggestive
and lewd remarks.” The employer also “physically touched” the woman
during this period. However, the contacts during this period did not result
in any “observable bodily harm such as cuts or bruises the woman’s body,
nor did they cause extreme pain to the woman.”

52. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000), at *5. A letter ruling is a response from
the IRS to a written request by a taxpayer asking for guidance on how the IRS will treat a particular
set of facts. It is binding on the IRS with respect to the taxpayer who requested the Private Letter
Ruling, and may not be used by other taxpayers. However, they are often relied upon because they
provide an indication of how the IRS might interpret the Code under a given set of facts. See, e.g.,
Byrne v. Comm’r, 84 T.C.M (CCH) 704, 710 n.14 (2002) (“Although private letter rulings are not
precedent, . . . they do reveal the interpretation put upon the statute by the agency charged with the
responsibility of administering the revenue laws.”).
53. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000), at *4. Most cases that purported to address
the personal physical injury exclusion reach their holdings because, they conclude, the taxpayers
failed to demonstrate that the damages were awarded “on account of” purported personal physical
injuries, rather than because the injuries did not meet the definition of “personal physical injuries.”
See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 34. The bruise ruling, though, does reach that question.
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Period B—The Period Beginning with the First Pain Incident and
leading up to the First Physical Injury: Some time after Period A, the
employer did assault the woman, causing her “extreme pain.” And, after
the First Pain Incident, the woman began to have headaches and digestive
problems, although doctors could not find anything physically wrong with
her. The woman did not assert in her request to the IRS that those
problems were due to the First Pain Incident or to events prior to the First
Pain Incident.
Period C—The Period Beginning with the First Physical Injury: On
an even later date, the employer assaulted the woman again. This time,
the employer cut and bit her. The IRS referred to this incident as the “First
Physical Injury.” The employer later physically and sexually assaulted the
woman, cutting her in one incident. As result of yet “another series of”
assaults, the woman suffered skin discoloration, swelling, and extreme
pain for which she sought medical treatment.
In determining whether damages awarded to the woman were
excludable as being on account of “personal physical injuries” under §
104(a)(2), the Private Letter Ruling (“PLR”) first searched for a definition
of “personal physical injuries.” The PLR recognized that § 104(a)(2) does
not define “personal physical injury,” nor does its legislative history.
Thus, the PLR turned to Black’s Law Dictionary for some semblance of
a definition. Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of “physical injury” was
“bodily harm or hurt, excluding mental distress, fright, or emotional
disturbance.” 54 Based on that definition, the PLR concluded that “we
believe that direct unwanted or uninvited physical contacts resulting in
observable bodily harms such as bruises, cuts, swelling, and bleeding are
personal physical injuries under 104(a)(2).”
Applying that definition to Periods A and C only, the PLR concluded
as follows:
Period A: Any damages received for events occurring before the First
Pain Incident were not “personal physical injuries” under § 104(a)(2).
During that period, the unwanted physical contact did not result in any
observable harms to the woman, nor did it cause the woman pain. 55

54. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000), at *4 (quoting physical injury, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (rev. 4th ed. 1968)). Black’s has revised its definition. See physical injury,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“bodily injury. Physical damage to a person’s body. —
Also termed personal injury; personal bodily injury; physical injury.”).
55. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000), at *2–6. A did not argue that any medical
treatment she received after the First Pain Incident were related to the period prior to the First Pain
Incident. In short, for that period, there was no observable harm, pain, or medical expenses.
Presumably, the fact that she did not incur medical expenses was relevant to determining whether
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Period C: Any damages received for the period beginning with the
First Physical Injury were “personal physical injuries” under §104(a)(2).
The woman suffered “physical injuries”—now defined by the Private
Letter Ruling as “direct unwanted or invited physical contacts resulting in
observable bodily harms such as bruises, cuts, swelling and bleeding”—
beginning with the First Physical Injury. 56
Period B: As to physical contact that causes pain but no observable
bodily harm, the PLR seems to leave open the possibility that physical
pain can constitute physical injury without observable mementos. But the
PLR made no decision in the instant case. The PLR explained that
“Because the perception of pain is essentially subjective, it is a factual
matter. Therefore, pursuant to § 7.01 of Internal Revenue Procedure 20001, 57 we cannot rule whether damages properly allocable to the First Pain
Incident (a physical contact that did not manifest itself in the form of a cut
bruise, or other similar bodily harm) were received on account of personal
physical injuries or physical sickness.” 58
Thus, in the IRS’s view, 59 where there is an observable injury, all
damages flowing from that injury, including emotional distress, are
excludable. Once a plaintiff crosses that threshold, all damages flowing
from the physical event, including emotional distress damages, are
excluded. Of course, particularly in the case of sexual harassment, which
often involves lengthy periods, identifying the “watershed” 60 moment
where the observable bodily harm occurs, marking the point in time at
which damages are excluded, is a difficult problem of proof and
allocation. 61

there were any excludable medical expense reimbursement damages for that period, as opposed to the
medical expenses being an indication that she had suffered some “physical” injury.
56. Id. at *5. Her punitive damages were, of course, taxable under §104(a)(2).
57. Section 7.01 of Rev. Proc. 2000-1 provides that the Service does not have discretion to
issue letter rulings if a problem is factual in nature. Rev. Proc. 2000-1 I.R.B. 5 (“Under what
circumstances does the Service have discretion to issue letter rulings and determination letters? . . .
Ordinarily not in certain areas because of factual nature of the problem.”).
58. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200041022 (Oct. 13, 2000), at *5.
59. It is true that, in some instances, the tax court is willing to apply a more lenient standard
than the “cutting, bruising, or swelling” standard of the IRS. See Benjamin T. Cory, Note, Amos v.
Commissioner: The Ambiguous and Ever-Changing Definition of What Constitutes a Personal
Physical Injury Under Internal Revenue Code Section 104(a)(2), 66 MONT. L. REV. 247, 262 (2005).
Nevertheless, the meaning of “personal physical injury” needs clarification.
60. Wood, supra note 26, at 285 (noting the “watershed” nature of physicality determination).
61. See, e.g., Prasil v. Comm’r, 85 T.C.M. (CCH) 1124, 1129 (2003) (holding that a sexual
harassment award was fully taxable).
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Three Law Clerks—Effect Under Bruise Ruling

Returning to the three hypothetical law clerks and application of the
bruise ruling to those victims: Under § 104(a)(2), in order for damages for
emotional distress to be excluded from taxable income, the emotional
distress must attributed to a “personal physical injury.” And, according to
the Bruise Ruling, an injury is a “personal physical injury” only if there is
an observable bodily harm.
Thus, for tax purposes, the emotional distress of Law Clerk 2—who
was groped and bruised—is treated just like the emotional distress of
Lawyer 1, the car accident victim, and Law Clerk 2, the punch in the nose
victim. That emotional distress is attributable to a “physical injury” and
thus damages to compensate those plaintiffs for that emotional distress are
excluded from taxable income.
In contrast, the emotional distress of Law Clerk 3 (although she
suffered the same sexual harassment and “groping” as Law Clerk 2) is
treated as the emotional distress of Lawyer 2 who was wrongfully
terminated from employment.
It seems illogical to treat the emotional distress of one of the sexual
assault victims like the emotional distress of the wrongful termination
plaintiff simply because her assault was not memorialized with a bruise
or a cut. It seems inherently more logical to treat the emotional distress of
both sexual assault victims the same. Both should be treated like the
emotional distress of the car accident victim and the punch-in-the-nose
victim. The sexual assault that does not leave a bruise is not inherently
less “physical” than a groping that does leave a bruise. Any sexual assault,
groping, or fondling is inherently physical. And one can imagine some
kind of groping that would be much more physical (and much more
traumatic) than a groping that does leave a bruise.
At least one scholar has similarly argued that some things are
“inherently and incontrovertibly physical, whether or not they leave
lasting outward scars.” 62 Based on that premise, he has argued that
damages awards for false imprisonment should not be subject to
taxation. 63 Robert Wood writes: “It is hard to imagine a more obvious
degree of physicality than being physically confined behind bars. Even if
62. Wood, supra note 26, at 285.
63. Robert H. Wood, Why False Imprisonment Recoveries Should Not Be Taxable, 123 TAX
NOTES, June 8, 2009, at 1217. The Sixth Circuit in Stadnvk v. Commissioner, however, has held that
they are not. 367 F. App’x 586, 587–89 (6th Cir. 2010). In Stadnvk, the taxpayer was wrongfully
accused of writing a bad check and was falsely imprisoned. She was arrested and handcuffed and
confined to a cell, which seem to have certainly impacted her physically. Nonetheless, the court
determined that there was no physical injury and thus no §104(a)(2) exclusion.
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no bruises or broken bones befall the plaintiff while behind bars, it seems
axiomatically physical to be physically confined.” 64 The same is true for
unwanted and uninvited physical contact with the body. 65
This Article proposes an understanding of § 104(a)(2) “personal
physical injuries” that is consistent with the idea that some torts are
inherently physical. The following section attempts to concretize the
proposition that some torts are inherently physical. Even without a bruise
to memorialize the occasion, some torts are sufficiently physical to fall
within the “personal physical injury” exclusion.
IV. DAMAGES AWARDED FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ATTRIBUTABLE TO
AN INVASION INTO PERSONAL AUTONOMY, PHYSICAL SECURITY, OR
PHYSICAL LIBERTY SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM TAXABLE INCOME
UNDER § 104(A)(2), EVEN WITHOUT OBSERVABLE BODILY HARM.

Tort law has long protected against invasions into personal
autonomy, physical security, and physical liberty. 66 Invasions into those
interests are “physical injuries.” Tort law distinguishes between an injury
and the harms caused by that injury. For example, a physical injury might
cause bodily harm and emotional harm. But the harm is a distinct concept
from the injury. For these physical injuries—invasions into personal
autonomy, physical security, and physical liberty—the plaintiff is not
required to show harm. 67 It is presumed. Those plaintiffs are not required
to show bodily harm. And they can recover for emotional harm without
proving it. Tort law has always acknowledged emotional harm arising
from these physical invasions.
In contrast, when a plaintiff alleges emotional harm arising from
invasion of a nonphysical interest, tort law is much more skeptical of his
claim. Thus, tort law treats emotional harm somewhat like § 104(a)(2)
treats emotional distress in that it distinguishes between emotional harm
arising from a physical injury and emotional harm arising from a
nonphysical injury. The personal physical injury exclusion of § 104(a)(2)
should, as tort law does, consider the type of injury that is the source of
emotional harm. But, it should also, as tort law does, treat invasions into

64. Robert H. Wood, Should False Imprisonment Damages Be Taxable?, 81 N.Y. ST. B.J. 38,
38 (2009).
65. Wood, supra note 26, at 285 (stating that sex abuse, sexual assault, and rape surely fit the
category of things that are inherently and incontrovertibly physical whether or not they leave outward
scars).
66. Infra Part III.B.2.; DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 3 (2d ed.).
67. Infra Part III.B.1.
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personal autonomy, physical security, and physical liberty as a “physical
injury.” It should not require observable bodily harm; tort law never has.68
This Article will hereinafter refer to the invasions of the above three
interests as “injuries,” as does the Restatement. 69 Thus, this Article will
use the terms “physical injuries,” “emotional injuries,” and “economic
injuries.” To distinguish between this tort concept of physical injury—an
invasion into an interest in autonomy, physical security, and physical
liberty—and the § 104(a)(2) term “physical injury,” this Article will
designate where references are to “§ 104(a)(2) physical injury.” Without
such a designation, this Article is referring to the tort concept of “physical
injury”—an invasion into a person’s interest in autonomy, physical
security, and physical liberty.
As demonstrated in Part A below, the meaning of the § 104 personal
injury exclusion has always drawn on tort principles. Section B explains
the difference between a tort “injury” and a tort “harm” and the type of
tort. Section C demonstrates that tort law treats emotional harm differently
depending on the type of injury causing the emotional harm. Section D
explains the ultimate proposition: that the “personal physical injury”
exclusion of § 104(a)(2) should be interpreted consistently with the
ancient understanding that tort law protects against intentional physical
injuries to the person regardless of bodily harm. Thus, although damages
awarded to compensate for emotional harm flowing from emotional or
economic injuries are not excluded from taxable income under §
104(a)(2), emotional harm flowing from all physical injuries should be
excluded under § 104(a)(2).
A.

Interpretations of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion have historically drawn
on tort law principles.

The IRS and the Supreme Court have looked to tort law in
interpreting the Code’s personal injury exclusion. The Supreme Court
recognized in United States v. Burke 70 that the IRS has “linked
identification of a personal injury for purposes of 104(a)(2) to traditional
tort principles.” 71 United States v. Burke involved a Title VII action in
68. Infra Part III.C.
69. Infra note 93.
70. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229 (1992).
71. Id. at 234 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1991)). The Burke Court also quoted the Tax
Court’s explanation in Threlkeld v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1305 (1986), aff’d, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir.
1988), that “[t]he essential element of an exclusion under section 104(a)(2) is that the income involved
must derive from some sort of tort claim . . . . As a result, common law tort law concepts are helpful
in deciding whether a taxpayer is being compensated for a ‘personal injury.’” Burke, 504 U.S. at 234.
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which the complainants alleged that their employer had discriminated
against them on the basis of sex in determining salaries. 72 They sought
injunctive relief and backpay for all affected female employees. 73 The
female employees argued that the backpay they received should be
excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2) as “damages received . . .
on account of personal injuries or sickness.” 74 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to address the question of whether Title VII backpay awards
should be excluded from gross income under that language of §
104(a)(2). 75
The majority opinion recognized at the outset that neither the text of
the statute nor its legislative history offers any explanation of the term
“personal injures.” 76 It thus turned to the relevant IRS regulation that
demonstrated that the IRS had, since at least 1960, “linked identification
of a personal injury for purposes of 104(a)(2) to traditional tort
principles.” 77 The Court quoted Treasury Regulation 1.104-1(c), which
read as follows: “The term “damages received (whether by suit or
agreement)” means an amount received . . . through prosecution of a legal
suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement
agreement entered in lieu of such prosecution.” 78 Based on the treasury
regulation, the Court determined that, to decide whether the § 104(a)(2)
personal injury exclusion applied, one must look to the nature of the claim
underlying the damages and determine whether the claim seeks redress
for a tort-like personal injury. 79
The Treasury Regulation the Court relied upon in Burke was
modified in 2012—many years after the 1996 modification of §
104(a)(2). 80 The 2012 Regulation eliminates the tort-type right test, 81 but
72. Burke, 504 U.S. at 231–32.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 233.
76. Id. at 234.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 1.104-1(c) (1991)).
79. Id. The next question, then, was how to determine whether a claim is for a “tort-like
personal injury.” The Court found critical, to identifying a tort claim, whether the claim provides for
a broad range of remedies, such as “lost wages, medical expenses, and diminished future earning
capacity” and also “emotional distress and pain and suffering.” Having decided that whether a claim
is for a tort or tort-like injury depends on whether the claim allows for a broad range of remedies as
traditionally available for tort claims, the Court examined the basis for the plaintiffs’ back pay claim—
Title VII. Because Title VII did not allow the plaintiffs to recover for such a broad range of remedies,
such as emotional distress, the Court concluded that the injury the plaintiffs suffered were not
“personal injuries” under the §104(a)(2) and thus were not excluded.
80. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)(1) (2012).
81. See id.
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the IRS reiterated that the personal injury exclusion—physical or not, but
particularly if it is physical—is rooted in tort concepts. 82 In the IRS’s
view, the tort-type right test was necessary only to distinguish tort claims
from contract claims and thus exclude only damages for tort claims. 83
Second, in the IRS’s view, adding the word “physical” to the exclusion
rendered the distinction between personal injury (tort) claims and contract
claims is no longer necessary. 84 Ostensibly, if a claim is for personal
physical injury, it is by definition a tort claim and not a contract claim.
The exclusion should be interpreted consistent with tort principles.
B.

Tort law distinguishes between “injury” and “harm.”
1. A Tort “Injury” Distinguished from a Tort “Harm”

The Restatement (Second) of Torts distinguishes between “injury”
and “harm.” “Injury” refers to “the invasion of any legally protected
interest of another.” 85 “Harm” refers to “the existence of loss or detriment
in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any cause.” 86
The term “harm,” unqualified, is very broad. Examples of “harm”
include an alteration or change in one’s person; an alteration of change in
physical things; and the detriment resulting to a person from acts or
conditions that impair his physical, emotional, or aesthetic wellbeing, his
pecuniary advantage, intangible rights, reputation, or other legally
recognized interests.87 The Restatements often qualify the term “harm”
with terms like “bodily harm,” “physical harm,” and “pecuniary harm.” 88
To distinguish between “injury” and “harm,” it may be useful to
conceive of a (somewhat) chronological chain of events: tortious act,
injury, harm, then damages. First, the defendant acts (or fails to act)
tortiously. Second, as a result of the defendant’s tortious act, the plaintiff
suffers an injury—a violation of his legally protected interest. Third, the

82. T.D. 9573, 77 Fed. Reg. 3106, 3107 (Jan. 23, 2012).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The word “injury” is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the invasion
of any legally protected interest of another. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1) (AM. L. INST.,
1965).
86. The word “harm” is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote the existence
of loss or detriment in fact of any kind to a person resulting from any cause. Id. § 7(2).
87. Id. § 7, cmt. b.
88. Id. § 7(2).
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plaintiff may suffer “harm” as a result of the injury. Lastly, the plaintiff is
awarded “damages” 89 to compensate for his harm.
As an illustration to distinguish between the four “events,” consider
the tort of trespass to land. First, the defendant acts tortiously by
intentionally entering the land of the plaintiff without permission. Second,
the injury suffered by the plaintiff is the invasion of his interest in
exclusive possession of the land. What “harm”—actual loss or
detriment—does the plaintiff suffer? And what “damages” will the
plaintiff be awarded for his harm?
Say that the trespass to land involves the defendant riding his bicycle
into the plaintiff’s lawn and ruining his garden. The plaintiff has suffered
actual loss or detriment to his property—that is, he has suffered harm.
Thus, he can recover damages to compensate him for that harm.
But say that the trespass to land results in no actual loss or
detriment—not a blade of grass is bent. That plaintiff can nonetheless
maintain a claim for trespass—even without showing any “harm”—any
loss or detriment. This is because, for the tort of trespass to land and
certain other torts, as will be discussed further below, the plaintiff’s harm
is presumed. The defendant’s tortious act and the plaintiff’s “injury” are
sufficient for the plaintiff to maintain a claim; 90 no proof of harm is
required. 91
For purposes of this Article, the points to be derived from the above
illustration regarding trespass to land are as follows: First, an “injury”—
an invasion of a legally protected interest—is distinct from the “harm”
that might flow from that injury. Second, for some tort “injuries,” tort law
will presume that “harm” results simply because of the nature of the
injury.
2. Three Categories of Tort Injuries
Tort law protects against invasions of at least three board categories
of legal interests. 92 That is, the types of tort injuries can be categorized
into one of the following three categories—physical injuries, intangible

89. The word “damages” is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote a sum
of money awarded to a person injured by the tort of another. Id. § 12(A).
90. See id. § 7, cmt. (a).
91. Id. Such a plaintiff will not be awarded any compensatory damages, as there is no harm for
which to compensate him. He might, however, be awarded nominal damages and an injunction against
further trespass.
92. DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.
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injuries, and economic injuries. 93 The following section considers those
three types of injuries in support of the penultimate point of this Article
that the § 104(a)(2) personal physical injury exclusion should be
interpreted to include damages for emotional distress (emotional harm)
flowing from these “physical injuries.”
Physical Injuries—Invasions of Physical Interests
Tort law protects against invasions to a person’s interest in his or her
“primary autonomy, physical security, and physical liberty.” 94 This
category protects against physical interference with either the plaintiff’s
person or property, 95 and these interests are afforded the greatest
protection by the law. 96 The trespassory torts—trespass to land, harmful
battery, offensive battery, assault, and false imprisonment 97—protect
against these type of invasions. The tort of negligence also provides
redress for physical invasion. 98
Intangible Injuries—Invasions of Emotional and Other Intangible
Interests
Although more reluctantly, tort law also protects against invasions to
a person’s intangible interests such as emotional security, privacy, and
reputation. 99 Claims for violation of the right of privacy, defamation, and
slander seek redress for this type of invasion; 100 these might be called
dignitary torts. 101 Claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress and
intentional infliction of emotional distress also seek redress for these types
of invasions, 102 but courts are even more reluctant to impose liability for
a violation of the interest in emotional security without a physical
interference with personal or property (a “physical injury” discussed in

93. An invasion of an interest is a tort “injury.” See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(1)
(AM. L. INST., 1965).
94. DOBBS, supra note 66, § 3.
95. Id.
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ch. 2, intro. note (AM. L. INST., 1965).
97. DOBBS, supra note 66, § 28.
98. Id. § 3.
99. Id. (“When it comes to intangible harm without physical interference or physical harm,
courts are much more reluctant to impose tort liability.”).
100. Id.
101. Offensive battery and assault might also be labeled as “dignitary torts” in that they involve
“legally cognizable invasions of rights that stand independent of both physical and economic harms,
that is, invasions of human dignity in the sense of human worth” such as when a battery is
“interference with the plaintiff’s autonomy, her right to prevent unconsented-to touchings.” That
dignitary tort label should be distinguished from freestanding dignitary torts that involve no physical
invasion or direct threat of it, such as defamation or invasion of privacy. See id. § 514.
102. Id.
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the preceding paragraph) or violation of a specific right such as the right
to reputation or the right to privacy. 103
Economic Injuries—Invasions of Economic Interests
Third, tort law sometimes protects invasions of the interests in
economic security and opportunity. 104 An example would be a defendant
“negligently block[ing] access to the plaintiff’s retail store, without
trespassing or harming the property itself,” such that customers cannot
reach the store. 105 Fraud is another example. 106 Just as courts are more
reluctant to protect interest in emotional security absent some physical
interference with person or property, courts—at least in the realm of tort
law, as distinguished from contract law—are also reluctant to protect
invasions of economic interests. 107
3. Harms Arising from Those Tort Injuries
Different types of “harms”—for example, bodily, economic, or
emotional—might arise from the different types of tort injuries. For
example, consider that any of the above types of tort injuries can cause
economic harm. A physical injury like a punch in the nose or trespass to
land can result in economic harm such as lost wages, medical bills, or
repair costs. 108 An intangible injury such as defamation or fraud can also
result in economic harm such as lost income. An economic injury such as
interference with a business relationship can result in economic harm such
as lost income. The important point here is that economic injury is distinct
from an economic harm caused by an economic injury (or by an emotional
injury or a physical injury). 109
Understanding that economic harm is a different concept from
economic injury should make it easier to understand a critical point for
this Article—that emotional injury is different from emotional harm. That
is important, for purposes of this Article, because this Article argues that,
although damages awarded to compensate for emotional harm flowing
from emotional or economic injuries are not excluded from taxable under

103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Id. § 605.
106. Id. § 606.
107. Id.
108. Id. § 605 (“Any kind of tort can cause financial harm. . . . [H]owever, the economic harm
is not itself the tort.”).
109. See id.
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§ 104(a)(2), emotional harm flowing from physical injuries should be
excluded under § 104(a)(2). 110
Other terms that need clarification before proceeding further are
“physical harm” and “bodily harm.” 111 The term “physical harm” in the
Restatement (Second) denotes the physical impairment of the human
body, but it also includes physical impairment of land or chattel. 112
“Bodily harm,” is a more specific type of “physical harm.” “Bodily harm”
is defined by the Restatement (Second) as “any physical impairment of
the condition of another’s body, or physical pain or illness.” 113
What is “emotional harm?” The Restatement (Second) uses the terms
“emotional distress” and “emotional disturbance” without defining
either. 114 The Restatement does indicate, though, that emotional
disturbance is distinct from bodily harm. “The minute disturbance of the
nerve centers caused by fear, shock, or other emotions does not constitute
bodily harm.” 115 It also recognizes that such emotional disturbances may
cause bodily harm. 116 This Article will hereinafter use the term
“emotional harm” in a precise way that distinguishes the concept of
“harm” from “injury,” as explained above, and distinguishes “emotional”
harm from bodily or pecuniary harm.
C.

Tort law treats emotional harm arising from a physical injury
differently from emotional harm arising from an emotional or
economic injury.

This section explains that tort law treats emotional harm differently
depending on the type of injury causing the emotional harm. The personal

110. This may read like a reiteration of what the legislative history and regulations already say.
But, it is different in that the term “physical injury” here is much broader than those interpretations
of “personal physical injury.” See infra Part IV.
111. The Restatements often qualify the term “harm” with terms like “bodily harm,” “physical
harm,” and “pecuniary harm.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7(2) (AM. L. INST., 1965).
112. Id. § 7 cmts.
113. Id. § 15. The comments to the Restatement explain that there is an impairment “if the
structure or function of any part of the other’s body is altered to any extent even though the alteration
causes no other harm.” Section 104(a)(2)’s concept of “physical injury” seems to be more in line with
the Restatement “bodily harm” than the much broader Restatement term “physical harm.”
114. See id. § 46–48 (“emotional distress”); id. § 436, 456 (“emotional disturbance”).
115. Id. § 15, cmt. (b).
116. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) also recognizes that emotional harm can cause bodily harm, but it does
not include within the exclusion bodily harm that result from emotional harm. It has been argued that
at least some physical manifestations of emotional distress should be treated as physical illness and
thus excluded. Wood, supra note 26, at 283 (“some physical consequences [of emotional distress]
must be viewed as serious enough to constitute physical injury or physical sickness [under §
104(a)(2)].”).
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physical injury exclusion of § 104(a)(2) should, as tort law does, consider
the type of injury that is the source of emotional harm. In addition, it
should, as tort law does, treat all emotional harm flowing from personal
injuries the same, regardless of whether bodily harm also results from the
personal injury. Although damages awarded to compensate for emotional
harm flowing from emotional or economic injuries are not excluded from
taxable income under § 104(a)(2), emotional harm flowing from all
physical injuries should be excluded under § 104(a)(2).
Just as economic harm could flow from any type of injury, emotional
harm could flow from any type of injury. First, emotional harm might flow
from physical injury that also produces bodily harm, such as in the case
of a classic battery or a negligent car accident. Second, emotional harm
might flow from a physical injury that did not produce any bodily harm.
Third, emotional harm might flow from an intangible or emotional injury,
such as in a case for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional
distress or libel. Fourth, emotional harm might also flow from a pecuniary
injury such as fraud.
Emotional harms flowing from the third and fourth types of injuries
are treated less favorably by tort law than emotional harms flowing from
physical injuries. And it is these less favored emotional harms that are the
emotional harms for which § 104(a)(2) does not provide an exclusion. It
is relatively easy to conclude that by adding “physical,” Congress does
not intend to tolerate an exclusion for damages awarded to compensate
for emotional harms that might arise from economic injuries or even
emotional or intangible injuries. 117
The emotional harms resulting from physical injuries, though, should
be excluded under § 104(a)(2). And it should not matter, with respect to
intentional torts, 118 whether that personal injury resulted in bodily harm.
Nor should it matter whether bodily harm is observable.
It is axiomatic that, when a physical injury, such as a classic harmful
contact 119 battery, causes bodily harm and that bodily harm causes
emotional harm, the plaintiff can recover for his emotional harm. 120 It is
also well understood that even when a physical injury, such as an
offensive battery or assault does not cause bodily harm, the plaintiff can

117. See supra Part IV.
118. A negligence claim requires proof of actual harm and so, in the context of a negligence
claim, the arguments presented in this Article are less relevant.
119. “Harmful contact battery” is used here to distinguish from an “offensive contact” battery.
120. See DOBBS, supra note 66, § 382 (“The first and most common kind of emotional distress
recovery occurs when emotional distress is merely an item of damages resulting from some other tort
such as battery.”).
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recover for his emotional harm. 121 Tort law treats an offensive sexual
groping, offensive spitting, or false imprisonment just as legitimate as a
claim for a punch in the nose. 122 When a defendant has intentionally 123
and tortiously invaded the plaintiff’s right to autonomy, physical security,
or physical liberty, the plaintiff can recover for all harms resulting from
the injury, including emotional harm resulting therefrom. 124 Courts have
had no difficulty recognizing emotional harm suffered as a result of such
an intentional physical invasion, regardless of bodily harm.
In addition, the plaintiff’s harm is presumed in such cases. 125 The
plaintiff need not establish any harm. The invasion alone is sufficient to
support a claim; these “trespassory” torts are regarded as “harmful in
themselves.” 126
For example, battery, one of the oldest torts, provides legal redress
for “the least touching of another” according to Blackstone.127 Every
man’s person is sacred, and no other has a right to meddle with it. 128 To
make a case for battery, the plaintiff must merely show that the
121. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. (a) (AM. L. INST. 1934) (“A contact which
causes no bodily harm may be actionable as a violation of the right to freedom from the intentional
infliction of offensive bodily contacts.”); DOBBS, supra note 66, § 47 (“When the trespassory tort
causes no physical harm, the traditional tort rule is that the plaintiff can nevertheless recover
substantial as distinct from nominal damages. The idea is loosely linked to the idea of mental distress,
but no actual proof of mental distress is required. The invasion of the plaintiff’s rights is regarded as
a harm in itself and subject to an award of damages. If the plaintiff suffers emotional distress as a
result of any of these torts, even without physical harm, she is entitled to recover for that emotional
distress as a separate element of damages.”).
122. E.g., Deana Pollard Sacks, Intentional Sex Torts, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1075–76
(2008) (“Dignitary harm is presumed to flow from interference with bodily autonomy, because the
right to bodily autonomy is considered integral to self determination and therefore is fiercely
protected.”).
123. The tort of negligence also provides redress for physical invasion, but a plaintiff in a
negligence case must prove harm in order to recover. Once a plaintiff has proven bodily harm resulting
from a negligent physical invasion, though, he can recover for any other harms flowing therefrom,
including emotional harm. DOBBS, supra note 66, § 120 (contrasting negligence with the trespassory
torts: “[n]o matter how offended or distressed the plaintiff might be when the defendant drives at 100
mph in a school zone, the defendant is not liable for negligence if he causes no harm. What counts as
actual harm may be debated . . . but the underlying rule that harm is required has not been doubted.”).
124. See id. § 48 (“When the defendant causes emotional distress by inflicting an unconsentedto and unjustified touching, or by inflicting any trespassory tort, the plaintiff can claim emotional
distress damages resulting from that tort, without proving the elements of tort called intentional
infliction of emotional distress.”).
125. Id. § 28 (“All of these torts are actionable even if the plaintiff has no proven physical harm.
Perhaps courts assume that the plaintiff suing for a trespassory tort has some kind of emotional harm,
but if so, the plaintiff is not required to prove it.”).
126. See id. § 47 (“The invasion of the plaintiff’s rights is regarded as a harm in itself . . . .”).
127. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND, Book 3, Ch. 8 (1765–
1769) (stating that the tort of battery “prohibits the first and lowest stage of it.”).
128. Id.
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defendant’s intentional act resulted in an offensive touching of the
plaintiff’s person or something so closely associated with the plaintiff as
to make the touching tantamount to a physical invasion of the plaintiff’s
person. 129 “[T]he essence of the plaintiff’s grievance consists in the
offense to the dignity involved in the unpermitted and intentional invasion
of the inviolability of his person and not in any physical harm done to his
body. . . .” 130 For that reason, it is not even necessary that the plaintiff’s
actual body be disturbed. 131 It is the physical invasion that is important,
not whether the plaintiff suffered bodily versus emotional harm. 132
The tort of assault likewise involves an invasion of a physical interest
and allows recovery for emotional harm regardless of bodily harm. 133 But
the emotional harm suffered by an assault victim is not the type of
“emotional harm” the law has been skeptical of or reluctant to address.134
The tort has been recognized at least since 1348 in I. de S. and Wife v. W.
De S., in which the court ruled that emotional harm alone, even without
any accompanying bodily harm, is itself an injury for which the law,
through the tort of assault, will grant recovery to a plaintiff.135 Similarly,
the tort of false imprisonment protects against invasions in physical
autonomy and for emotional harm regardless of bodily harm. 136
The important point here is that a plaintiff asserting a claim for
battery, assault, or false imprisonment has asserted invasion of a physical
interest—a physical injury to the person. 137 And those plaintiffs have
never been required to allege or prove bodily harm. They certainly have
not been required to prove any observable bodily harm. As long as the

129. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (AM LAW INST., 1965).
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. Goldberg & Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 938–39 (2010).
133. DOBBS, supra note 66, § 382 (“The tort of assault . . . involves nothing more than a threat
of immediate use of force that puts the plaintiff in reasonable apprehension of an unconsented-to
bodily touching. By definition, no physical harm is required. The recovery for assault is a recovery
for that unpleasant apprehension, a species of emotional distress.”).
134. E.g., Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 793–99 (Ind. 2008) (affirming jury award of
$325,000 for assault, even where jury rejected plaintiff’s intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim; plaintiff presented evidence that his major depressive disorder, anxiety and panic disorder was
caused by defendant’s assault).
135. I de S et ux. v. W de S, Y.B.Lib.Ass. folio 99, placitum 60 (Assizes 1348).
136. DOBBS, supra note 66, § 382.
137. Trespass to land also protects against a physical invasion of a different sort—an invasion
of the plaintiff’s interest in exclusive possession of the land. This Article does not attempt to suggest
that emotional harms arising from claims to trespass to land (or any other trespass to property tort)
should be excluded.
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tortious conduct is intentional, 138 it matters not whether the injury causes
bodily harm because the interest protected is against a physical invasion,
the most fiercely protected interest.
D.

The personal physical injury exclusion of § 104(a)(2) should, as
tort law does, treat all emotional harm flowing from personal
injuries the same, regardless of whether bodily harm also results
from the personal injury.

The “personal physical injury” exclusion of § 104(a)(2) should be
interpreted consistently with the ancient understanding that tort law
protects against intentional 139 physical injuries to the person regardless of
bodily harm. In its treatment of emotional harm, the personal physical
injury exclusion of § 104(a)(2) should, as tort law, consider the type of
injury that is the source of emotional harm. In addition, it should, as tort
law does, treat all emotional harm flowing from personal injuries the
same, regardless of whether bodily harm also results from the personal
injury. Although damages awarded to compensate for emotional harm
flowing from emotional or economic injuries are not excluded from
taxable income under § 104(a)(2), emotional harm flowing from all
physical injuries should be excluded under § 104(a)(2). In other words,
the “physical” qualifier of § 104(a)(2) should be interpreted to draw a line
between the first category of injuries—physical injuries—and the second
and third categories of injuries. With the 1996 “physical” qualifier and the
declaration that emotional distress is not physical injury, Congress did not
intend to tax emotional harms arising from tort physical injuries, such as
a sexual assault, but instead intended to target emotional harms arising
from emotional, intangible, and economic injuries, such as in cases of
defamation and employment discrimination.

138. Within the first category of injuries, the Restatement Second does treat the interest in
freedom from harmful bodily contacts (harmful contact battery) somewhat more favorably in that that
interest is protected against both negligent and intentional invasions, whereas the others are protected
only against intentional invasions. So long as the tortious conduct is intentional, though, the plaintiff
has a claim whether or not the contact causes bodily harm. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
15 (AM LAW INST., 1965).
139. The first category of protected interests are also addressed by the tort of negligence. A
claim for negligent physical invasion is distinguishable from a claim asserting an intentional invasion
in that the negligence claim will require proof of actual harm, whereas the intentional tort claim will
not. This Article does not make any argument that, where the harm is other than bodily, emotional
harms should be excluded. Where the negligently inflicted harm is bodily, even the current prevailing
interpretation of § 104(a)(2) will allow exclusion of damages awarded for emotional harms arising
from the bodily harm. Thus, in sum, this Article will not any further address damages for emotional
harms resulting from negligence claims.
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That interpretation would eliminate the need to distinguish even
further between bodily harms that are observable and those that are not. It
would avoid the rather absurd result of the Bruise Ruling 140 that required
the victim of offensive battery, likely assault, and likely common law
harmful battery to prove her harm with a bruise. It would give the same
tax treatment to the emotional distress damages awarded to Law Clerk 2
and Law Clerk 3—both of whom were sexually assaulted by their boss.
And, as explained in the following Part, it would still tax damages for
emotional harm that Congress actually sought to tax with the 1996
amendment.
E.

Semantics

Interpreting “personal physical injury” and “emotional distress”
under § 104(a)(2) as referring to tort injuries, as distinguished from tort
harms, reconciles what otherwise seems to be a flawed syllogism in the
statute and its legislative history.
Section 104(a)(2) excludes from income “damages received on
account of personal physical injuries.” 141 It then states that “emotional
distress shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness.” 142
Focusing on that statutory language alone, it would logically follow that
damages received on account of emotional distress are not excluded.
But, despite that logical syllogism, emotional distress damages often
are excluded, according to both legislative history and the regulations. 143
They are excluded if awarded “on account of a physical injury,” 144
although they are not considered a physical injury. How can it be that
emotional distress is not a physical injury but at the same time can be
attributable to a physical injury. This seems illogical.
It does make sense, though, if one considers the differing concepts
of a tort injury and a tort harm and applies the concept of emotional injury
to the code language and the concept of emotional harm to the legislative
history and regulations. Assume that the term “emotional distress” in the
140. See supra Part III(C).
141. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2018).
142. Id.
143. H.R. Rep. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996) (“Because all damages received on account of
physical injury or physical sickness are excludable from gross income, the exclusion from gross
income applies to any damages received based on a claim of emotional distress that is attributable to
a physical injury or physical sickness.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 2012) (“Emotional
distress is not considered a physical injury or physical sickness. However, damages for emotional
distress attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness are excluded from income under section
104(a)(2).”).
144. Id.
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§ 104(a)(2) language “emotional distress shall not be treated as a physical
injury” refers to emotional injury, not emotional harm. Assume that the
history and regulation reference to “emotional distress” refers to
emotional harm, not emotional injury.
Logically this makes sense: Damages received on account of
personal physical injuries (tort personal physical injuries) are excluded,
per § 104(a)(2). And, per the legislative history and the regulation, that
exclusion for personal physical injuries includes emotional harms (which
they label “emotional distress”) attributable to those personal physical
injuries. But, pursuant to the language of § 104(a)(2), damages received
on account of emotional injuries (which they also label “emotional
distress”) are not.
V. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AMENDMENT INDICATES THAT
ITS PURPOSE WAS TO REMOVE FROM THE EXCLUSION DAMAGES
AWARDED TO COMPENSATE FOR INTANGIBLE, EMOTIONAL, AND
PECUNIARY INJURIES, NOT THE “PHYSICAL INJURIES” EXPLAINED
ABOVE.

The legislative history of the 1996 amendment supports this Article’s
suggestion that § 104(a)(2)’s “personal physical injury” can be interpreted
as the tort concept of physical injury to the person, and thus, damages
awarded to compensate for emotional harms flowing therefrom are
excluded from taxable income, regardless of any preceding bodily harm,
such as in a case of sexual assault that leaves less than a bruise. The
legislative history indicates that, in narrowing “personal injury” to
“personal physical injury,” the purpose was to remove from the exclusion
damages awarded to compensate for intangible and pecuniary injuries,
including emotional harm flowing therefrom and physical manifestations
of that emotional harm. The legislative history provides no indication that
there was a desire to tax emotional distress damages arising from physical
injuries (as this Article uses that term), such as a sexual assault that leaves
less than a bruise.
First, it is important to note that Congress did not set out to tax all
emotional distress damages. Damages received for emotional distress are
sometimes excluded under § 104(a)(2). The exclusion does apply to
damages received based on a claim of emotional distress that is
“attributable to” a physical injury or physical sickness.145 Furthermore, a
145. The legislative history of the Act (the House Report), states: “Because all damages received
on account of physical injury or physical sickness are excludable from gross income, the exclusion
from gross income applies to any damages received based on a claim of emotional distress that is
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plaintiff can sometimes exclude emotional distress damages from income
even if the plaintiff is not the person who suffered the physical injury to
which the emotional distress can be attributed. 146 Damages for emotional
distress arising from loss of consortium and wrongful death are excluded
because they originated in a physical injury. 147 In addition, damages that
reimburse for medical expenses related to emotional distress are
excluded. 148 The target of the amendment, then, was not emotional
distress damages.
Instead, the goal of the amendment was to tax damages that are
intended to compensate for lost wages but that are dressed up as damages
for physical injuries in an attempt to be tax free “personal physical
injuries.” The modification was largely in response to plaintiffs in
employment lawsuits who would seek to allocate most of their damages
to emotional distress, which was then arguably excluded as a 104(a)(2)
“personal injury,” even though a significant portion of their claim was for
lost wages. 149 The Committee Report states:
Courts have interpreted the exclusion from gross income of damages
received on account of personal injury or sickness broadly in some cases
to cover awards for personal injury that do not relate to a physical injury
or sickness. For example, some courts have held that the exclusion
applies to damages in cases involving certain forms of employment

attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-737, at 300–01 (1996), as
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792–93. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in
2012) (“Emotional distress is not considered a physical injury or physical sickness. However,
damages for emotional distress attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness are excluded from
income under section 104(a)(2).”).
146. H.R. Rep. No. 104-737 reads:
If an action has its origin in a physical injury or physical sickness, then all damages (other
than punitive damages) that flow therefrom are treated as payments received on account
of physical injury or physical sickness whether or not the recipient of the damages is the
injured party. For example, damages other than punitive damages) received by an individual on account of a claim for loss of consortium due to the physical injury or physical
sickness of such individual’s spouse are excluded from gross income. In addition, damages
(other than punitive damages) received on account of a claim of wrongful death continue
to be excluded from taxable income as under present law. H.R. Rep. No. 104-737, 301
(1996).
147. Id.
148. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2018) (“The precedent sentence [which declares that emotional distress
shall not be treated as a physical injury or physical sickness] shall not apply to am amount of damages
not in excess of the amount paid for medical care . . . attributable to emotional distress.”).
149. Wood, supra note 26, at 283.
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discrimination and injury to reputation where there is no physical injury
or sickness. 150

In the section of the Committee Report entitled “Reasons for Change,” the
report offers that damages received on a claim not involving physical
injury or physical sickness “are generally to compensate the claimant for
lost profits or lost wages that would otherwise be included in taxable
income.” 151 Those claims were the target of the amendment. Why, then,
specifically address emotional distress?
In order to accomplish the goal of removing from the exclusion
damages that are “generally” intended to compensate for lost wages, but
which crafty plaintiffs might characterize as “physical injuries,” it was
necessary to specifically address emotional distress. Congress may have
been concerned that, if the exclusion continued to apply to emotional
distress, —that is, if emotional distress itself was considered a “physical
injury,” — employment discrimination plaintiffs (and the like) would
attempt to characterize most or all of their damages as being for emotional
distress, and therefore tax exempt, rather than for taxable income
replacement.152 Thus, Congress specified that “physical injury” does not
include emotional distress and further stated that the term emotional
distress includes physical symptoms (e.g., insomnia, headaches, stomach
disorders) which may result from such emotional distress. 153
Neither the code nor the legislative history defines “physical injury.”
But the Committee distinguished between, on the one hand, awards that

150.

H.R. Rep. No. 104-737, at 300–01 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1792–

93.
151. Id. (emphasis added). The Report also referenced two then-recently decided Supreme Court
cases as examples of types of claims targeted: Comm’r v. Schleier, and United States v. Burke. The
issue in Schleier was whether the taxpayer could exclude from taxable income backpay and liquidated
damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Comm’r v. Schleier, 515 U.S.
323, 324–25 (1995). The issue in Burke was whether the plaintiffs could exclude damages awarded
in a Title VII action alleged that their employer had discriminated against them on the basis of sex in
determining salaries. United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 230 (1992).
152. See Burke & Friel, supra note 19, at 184–85 (“One can only surmise that Congress
recognized that if emotional distress constituted a physical injury for purposes of § 104(a)(2), the
congressional purpose of negating an exclusion for damages on account of dignitary torts like
employment discrimination would be largely thwarted. For example, in virtually every case of
employment discrimination, a victim could be expected to argue that she suffered emotional distress
as a result of the employer’s actions and was suing the employer to recover for that injury. But for the
amendment language denying physical injury or physical sickness status to emotional distress, the
taxpayer’s action would come within the exclusionary rule of amended § 104(a)(2).”).
153. Wood, supra note 26, at 283 (asserting that the 1996 modification was in response to what
Congress and the IRS viewed as abuses by plaintiffs in employment lawsuits who would seek to
allocate most of their recoveries to emotional distress even though a significant portion of their claim
was for lost wages).
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do relate to a physical injury or sickness and, on the other hand, awards
that involve employment discrimination and injury to reputation. For the
former, damages for emotional distress are excluded under § 104(a)(2).
For the latter, however, damages for emotional distress are taxed because
they, generally, are intended to compensate for lost wages.
A claim for assault, offensive battery, or false imprisonment is not
generally intended to compensate for lost wages or income like a claim
for employment discrimination or injury to reputation. Thus, those claims
are not the target of the 1996 amendment. There is nothing in the code or
the legislative history to so indicate.
The House Report further states that “the taxation of damages
received in cases not involving a physical injury or physical sickness
should not depend on the type of claim made.” 154 Thus, if a case does not
redress a personal physical injury, there need not be any further inquiry
into the type of claim in order to determine whether the damages are
excluded under § 104(a)(2). They are taxable. If a case does redress a
personal physical injury, though, there is likewise no need to further
inquire into the type of claim. The damages awarded to compensate for
any harms suffered as a result should be excluded from taxable income
under § 104(a)(2).
VI. IRS NOD TO THE CONCEPT THAT SOME TORTS ARE INHERENTLY
PHYSICAL
In a 2007 Memorandum, the IRS was willing to assume § 104(a)(2)
“personal physical injuries” in a sex abuse case without evidence proving
that there were ever any observable bruises, cuts, or the like. 155 When the
man was a minor in the care of Entity A, Entity A’s employee caused
“physical injury” to the him through a tort. 156 Entity A made payments to
the man to settle the tort claims. 157 Although many years had passed, the
man “continue[d] to struggle with the trauma resulting from” the tort. 158
Because of the passage of time and because he was a minor at the time the
tort occurred, the man would “have difficult establishing the extent of the
physical injuries.” 159

154. H.R. Rep. No. 104-737, at 300–01 (1996).
155. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 200809001 at *2 (Nov. 27, 2007). It may be worth nothing that
the author, Michael J. Montemurro, also authored the Bruise Ruling.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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The IRS was willing to presume that man had been compensated for
personal physical injuries and held that all damages for emotional distress
were attributable to those personal physical injuries and thus excludable
under § 104(a)(2). “Under these circumstances, it is reasonable for the
Service to presume that the settlement compensated [the man] for personal
physical injuries, and that all damages for emotional distress were
attributable to the physical injuries.” 160
What circumstances made the presumptions necessary to conclude
that all of these damages were for emotional distress that is excludable
under § 104(a)(2) as attributable to physical injuries? His minority? The
passage of time? Both? Because it was, under those facts, “difficult to
establish the extent of the physical injuries?” The memorandum does not
say.
It was reasonable to make that presumption in that case of sex abuse,
as in any other, because such a plaintiff has suffered an invasion of the
plaintiff’s interest in primary autonomy, physical security, and physical
liberty—a “physical injury” as tort law understands that concept. It is also
reasonable to make that presumption in any case in which the plaintiff
proves all elements of battery, offensive or harmful; false
imprisonment; 161 or assault because, by definition, that plaintiff has
suffered a physical injury in that the defendant has invaded the plaintiff’s
interest in primary autonomy, physical security, and physical liberty.
These torts are, by their very nature, physical. It is difficult to deny that
this is true in cases of battery, whether or not it leaves a bruise. It seems
disingenuous to argue that an inappropriate, unwanted, sexual contact is
not “physical” simply because it does not leave a bruise. 162
VII.CONCLUSION
The personal physical injury exclusion of § 104(a)(2) should, as tort
law does, consider the type of injury that is the source of emotional harm
and, more specifically, treat all emotional harm flowing from personal
injuries the same, regardless of whether bodily harm also results from the
personal injury. Although damages awarded to compensate for emotional
harm flowing from emotional or economic injuries are not excluded from

160. Id.
161. Wood, supra note 26, at 285 (“If one is deprived of one’s personal liberty, if one is confined
unlawfully behind bars, is that not by its very nature physical? . . . [W]ouldn’t being confined in a jail
cell (unlawfully) always be physical?”).
162. Id. (“Some things are inherently and incontrovertibly physical, whether or not they leave
lasting outward scars. Sex abuse surely fits this category, as does rape or other sexual assault.”).
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taxable income under § 104(a)(2), emotional harm flowing from all
physical injuries should be excluded under § 104(a)(2).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol53/iss1/3

36

